FOREIGN POLICY AND THE
GOVERNMENT LEGAL ADVISER
Henry Darwin
It has been my privilege, both in our consultations privately and in
public debate on legal issues, to see the government legal advisers of the
United States in action. The differences and similarities are an interesting subject of study, and I would like therefore, in giving my personal
views today, to speak of a few particular aspects of these differences and
similarities in the light of the general theme which has been given for
this meeting.
If, in the course of this, I must venture on some description of American lawyers and American institutions, I hope that I will be heard a little
charitably by those present who, whether because they come from the
United States or not, know the United States better than I do.
In concentrating thus more specifically on Anglo-American divergences in this field, I could put the matter in a form of a question: Does
the government legal adviser in this country, or representing this country
abroad, play a different role or act differently than he would in or for
the United States?
The first difference which I would like to identify derives from the
differing role of the lawyer in the United States and in the United
Kingdom. Mr. Fawcett has interestingly already commented on this as
a subject relevant to our discussion tonight. It is my impression that in
the United States the lawyers penetrate much more deeply into the fabric
of the remainder of the society. They have a role of leadership, which
was referred to in the meeting this morning. Perhaps this is because at
the time when that community developed itself, there were no competing
hereditary, or military, or land-owning elites who could contest the leadership with them in a society which was forming itself. By contrast, in
this country the lawyers, particularly the judges and the members of the
Bar in the English sense, form a rather separate group. In the United
States the members of Congress, both Senators and Representatives, are
many" of them lawyers, and perhaps even more strikingly their personal
staffs seem from my experience to consist largely of extremely vigorous
lawyers. Historically, in the United Kingdom, Parliament is not sympathetic by and large to legal speakers, and lawyers have not by any means
had the same effect in politics. In the United States there is a written
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Constitution which is constantly under interpretation. In this country
half our constitution is not written. In the United States the public
debate in political circles on foreign affairs issues is much more open.
The hearings in the Congress occur frequently and involve detailed examination of legal issues which relatively rarely occurs here.
Picking up something that Professor Schwebel has said, I recall a
meeting of a committee of both Houses of Congress which was considering the sea-bed, at an earlier stage in the development of the international discussion of that matter, where the opening statement was made
by the Under Secretary of the State Department, Mr. Elliot Richardson.
But the difficult questions were fielded by the Legal Adviser to the State
Department, Mr. John Stevenson, who clearly spoke with an absolute
authority on behalf of the Executive at that hearing.
Although I must confess to having had some anxious moments in the
box for officials in the House of Commons when certain legal issues were
being debated, I do not believe that the examination in the House of
Commons of issues of international law is on the whole so far-reaching
as it is in the United States. One certainly meets this occasionally. I
recall the discussion in connection with the Simonstown Agreement' for
the sale of arms to South Africa; and I recall lengthy discussions in past
Rhodesia debates of issues of international law. But I do not have the
impression that the Parliamentary interest in this is so continuous and
pervasive as it is in the United States. Perhaps as a reflection of this
difference, the Foreign Office Legal Advisers appear less in public. In
the United States the American Society of International Law, and the
International Law Section of the American Bar Association, provide an
active, public, but unofficial forum for discussion. Here, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office Legal Advisers are personally in close contact
with the academic community of international lawyers. But this contact
does not appear in formal public fields of activity such as those which
are much in evidence in the United States.
Miss Gutteridge has already dealt from the English point of view, and
Professor Schwebel, from the American point of view, with the question
how far the government legal advisers in fact influence policy. I venture
to think that in the two countries the position is not so very different,
even if the machinery differs to some degree. All governments in deciding
on their policy have to take into consideration the relevant rules of
'Exchange of Letters Constituting an Agreement on Defence Matters Between the United Kingdom and South Africa, June 30, 1955, 248 U.N.T.S. 191.
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international law; and a government has to know how defensible in
public in terms of international law a given course of policy or action
is. The government legal adviser, in the same way as a private legal
adviser, is sometimes judge and sometimes advocate. He must be judge
to assess the view of the law for which his political colleague asks; and
he must be advocate when he represents his country in a legal group.
Turning now to the way in which the two countries present an argument in public, I was wondering-thinking over my own experience-how far the United States in arguing points of international law
differs in its presentation from the United Kingdom. Naturally there are
some specific points on which our position in international law differs.
The obvious example is in connection with the recognition of states; and
these differences of substantive view are sometimes interestingly reflected
in differences of underlying concept. Thus I have always thought that
the phrase "unrecognized state" means something conceptually quite
different to the United States lawyer from what, if it has any meaning,
it means to those British lawyers who support the doctrines initially
presented most clearly by Professor Hersch Lauterpacht and which the
United Kingdom Government has supported for many years.
It is my view, however, that on the whole the style of presentation of
argument (the important difference of language apart) is much the same
between the two countries, and the logical structure and the analysis are
markedly similar.
Because this has been so much a theme for earlier speakers, it may
be worth inquiring whether on that crucial distinction between policy
and law one finds any difference of presentation in public statements by
the United States and United Kingdom representatives. It is again my
impression that the presentation is the same. The United States legal
positions have not in general reflected what for convenience I may call
the Yale school of law. Indeed, it should be recalled of course that the
school of law so brilliantly represented at this meeting deriving, if one
must name a particular name, from Professor McDougal, is not the sole
United States view. For example, many of the arguments of Professor
Richard Baxter at Harvard are in precisely the same style that we would
be entirely familiar with in this country. And Professor Baxter is by no
means alone. Several of those who know the American international law
community better than I do during this meeting told to me half-a-dozen
people of similar distinction who could be named as equally representative of United States legal thinking and substantially similar in their
philosophy to the viewpoint held in this country and other countries.
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The main difficulty also in attempting to apply the Yale line of thinking to international foreign policy from a practical point of view of a
government representative seems to be that, as between its different
exponents, while the principle has something in common, the result is
notably different.
Now, I would be very reluctant, in the face of this distinguished
audience, to comment on Professor McDougal's theses in substance, or
equally on Professor Falk's theses. And to compare the two would
defeat my powers even more completely. Fortunately on this occasion I
can have recourse to the assessment of the distinguished lawyer to whom
we are indebted largely for this meeting: namely, Dr. Higgins. I would
like therefore to quote a very short passage from her article entitled
"Policy and Impartiality," where she expresses a view after close study
of this distinction:
Though these differences [i.e., the differences between the views of
Professor McDougal and Professor Falk which she had set out earlier]
are-usefully and properly-intellectualised, they represent a fairly
simple situation: McDougal and Falk are of different political dispositions and, operating within a legal framework in which policy is an
important consideration, find themselves with opposing views. Falk
believes that McDougal is preoccupied with cold-war confrontation to
the neglect of the aspirations and needs of the newer nations, and that
in this confrontation he is partisan rather than objective and impartial. 2
This clearly would make it difficult to present very persuasively a legal
position based on such a line of thinking when it is so manifestly dependent on politics. Indeed, one remembers that in the early days of equity,
it was suggested that before the rules of equity crystallized, equity depended on the length of the Chancellor's foot. I am tempted to say that
the conclusions of the school of law of the neo-natural lawyers depend
entirely on whether the Chancellor is left-handed or right-handed. The
distinction between law and politics (and this is the reason why we are
not troubled with that dialectic in international discussions) seems to be
substantially similar throughout the thinking of the members of the
General Assembly in general.
The Soviet Union, while recognizing on Marxist principles that law
rests on a political position (the class war, or what you will), does not
in fact confuse the two in presenting argument. The new nations cer2

Higgins, Policy and Impartiality: The Uneasy Relationship in International Law, 23
(1969).
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tainly assert new rules of law, but they do not assert that policy as such
is the law. They do not say, "This is the right policy, therefore it is the
law." They say, "This is the law, and therefore the world must make it
the policy."
Thus, for example, the right of self-determination as a legal right has
been pressed very vigorously, and even though it is very difficult to fit
into the traditional system of international law, so strongly is it believed
in by the newer nations, that it has been accepted both in the Covenants
on Human Rights 3 (where a better case can be made for it) and also in
the Declaration adopted by the Assembly on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States, Resolution 2625 (XXV).4 Thus, we hear very much more of the
law of decolonization, and the famous Resolution 1514(XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, 5 is spoken
of as the law-not because it is the policy and the right policy, but
because it is claimed to be the law.
In the same way we are beginning to hear and may hear more of a
law of development-that the rich countries are obliged to support the
economic efforts of the poor countries. But as I have said, in presenting
these arguments with vigor in a legal language, they do not base them
on the view that, because a particular line of behavior (I was going to
say "rule," but I should not say that clearly) is good policy, it is therefore the law. They do in fact have an easy basis for arguing that it is
the law as such in that the Charter is available to them, and particularly
its Purposes and Principles in articles I and 2. Therefore they are much
more likely to rest these new rules of law which they are asserting on
interpretation of the vague clauses of the Charter.
Here one cannot help noticing a striking similarity between the kind
of lines of argument which have been used by United States constitutional lawyers to develop whole, massive new fields of law, for instance
in the area of "due process," on the basis of very few words in that
extraordinary, short document, the Constitution of the United States.
But in general I do not believe that the field of international law study
as a whole does permit one to say that the view of the distinction favored
by the Yale school of law has been widely accepted. Certainly it has not
been found useful or helpful to base arguments on this line of thought,
'G.A. Res. 2200,21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
'25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
'15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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whether falling from the lips of United States respresentatives or United
Kingdom representatives.
Thus, I reach the conclusion that there is not a fundamental divergence in the views of policy and law as represented in, as far as I have
seen it, the private work-and certainly the public work-of the government legal advisers of the United States and the United Kingdom.

